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NOTE
A GENERIC DRUG PRICE SCANDAL: TOO BITTER
A PILL FOR THE DRUG PRICE COMPETITION




In 1984, with health care costs rising astronomically, Congress
drafted and enacted the Drug Price Competition & Patent Term Res-
toration Act (the Act).' The Act was written with two goals in mind: to
reduce health care costs by making generic drugs available more rap-
idly, and to foster new innovations in drug treatment by granting back
patent protection for time lost during the process of drug approval by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Once hailed as "the most
important consumer bill of the decade, '2 more recently the Act has
been criticized repeatedly. First, corruption was discovered within the
FDA.3 Then, the Act was chastised after some medical groups ques-
tioned the benefit of generic drugs for certain categories of patients, 4
and again when the passage of the General Agreement on Tariff and
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School 2000; M.S. University of
California, Davis 1997; B.S. Duke University 1995. I would like to thank Professors D.
Reginald Whitt and James Hall for all of their assistance with the manuscript. In
addition, thanks go to my family, friends, and especially to my wonderful wife, Molly.
1 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15, 21, 28, 35 U.S.C.). The Act is also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act
after its two co-sponsors, Republican Sen. Orrin Hatch (Utah) and Democratic Rep.
Henry Waxman (Cal.).
2 Pharmaceutical Patent Issues: Interpreting GATf: Hearings on S. 1277 Before the Sen-
ateJudiciayy Comm., 104th Cong. 93 (1998) (prepared statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch)
(quoting an unnamed source).
3 See infra Part II1.A.
4 See infra Part III.B.
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Trade (GATT) led to confusion and controversy over changes in the
patent system.5 However, in 1996, the Senate Judiciary Committee,
led by the Act's co-sponsor, Senator Orrin Hatch, pronounced the Act
healthy after hearings into its viability.
6
That diagnosis, predicated primarily on the Act's successes in cost
containment, may have been premature however. In December of
1998, following a year in which the prices of some generic drugs in-
creased 3000%, 7 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), joined by ten
states, brought a $120 million suit against Mylan Laboratories, Inc.
(Mylan) and three other drug companies for antitrust violations.8 In
light of this latest development, this Note reexamines the Act to deter-
mine whether it is as healthy as pronounced by Congress, or whether
it has failed to meet either or both of its goals. Part II of this Note
begins with a brief discussion of the history and status of the American
patent and health care systems leading up to 1984, followed by a de-
tailed review of the Act's provisions. Part III will touch on each of the
historic challenges to the Act, and how the Act survived or was
amended, and Part IV will describe the current conditions which call
the Act into question. Part V will conclude that, if the cost contain-
ment function continues to erode as it did in Mylan, we will no longer
be able to afford, literally or figuratively, the loss of pharmaceutical
innovation and the corresponding risks to societal health which the
Act induces.
II. THE DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION
ACT'S EFFECTS ON THE AMERICAN PATENT AND HEALTH
CARE SYSTEMS
A. The Patent System Before 1984
The power of Congress to establish the patent rights of inventors
is drawn directly from the United States Constitution, which autho-
rizes Congress "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to ... inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective . . . Discoveries." 9 Using this power, Congress first
5 See infra Part III.C.
6 See infra Part III.D.
7 See Definitely a Cause of Anxiety, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1998, at B8.
8 See Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 1, Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Mylan Lab., Inc. [hereinafter FTC Complaint]. The complaint is available
at the FTC webpage (visited Jan. 8, 1999) http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9812/my-
lancmp.htm (copy on file with Journal).
9 U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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recognized patents in 1790,10 and then created the Patent Office to
review patent submissions in 1836.11
In 1952, Congress significantly revamped the patent laws. 12
Under this scheme, which applies in large part today, inventors sub-
mit applications to the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), which
reviews them.13 Each application contains a description of the inven-
tion,' 4 with the inventor articulating the patent's scope.'5 The appli-
cation is then examined for how it meets three statutory
requirements: novelty, usefulness, and nonobviousness. 16 If granted,
the patent bestows an authorized monopoly on the holder for twenty
years, measured from the date of the application's filing.
17
Patenting a pioneer drug' s may not bestow as much market pro-
tection as one might think, however. The human body is not a simple
system in which only one drug will act in one particular way to pro-
duce one specified outcome; in such a system, patenting a drug would
grant a complete monopoly to the manufacturer. Instead, the bio-
chemical reactions which drugs affect are complex, multi-step
processes. Consequently, essentially identical outcomes can be ob-
tained either by targeting different intermediary steps in the reaction,
or by targeting the same reaction step with slightly different biochemi-
cal agents. Drugs using the same basic mechanism as a pioneer are
known as "me-too" drugs, and often appear on the market before a
pioneer drug's patent protection has lapsed.19
10 See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
11 See Act ofJuly 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117.
12 See Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 797 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 1-293 (1994)).
13 See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1994).
14 Note that 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) includes new "composition[s] of matter" as
an invention that is patentable; it is this definition that allows pharmaceuticals to be
patented.
15 See id. § 112 (1994).
16 See id. §§ 101-03 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
17 See Act ofJuly 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 804 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(a)(2) (1994)).
18 Drugs and the companies that make them are grouped into different catego-
ries depending on their approach to the market. "Pioneer" companies, also known as
"innovators," invest significant amounts in the research and development of new
drugs, also known as "pioneer" drugs, "breakthrough" drugs, or "name brand" drugs.
Once patent protection expires, "generic" drug companies combine the active ingre-
dients of pioneer drugs with different inactive substances to produce "generic" drugs
to compete with the name brand.
19 See CONG. BUDGET OFF., How INCREASED COMPETITION FRoM GENERIC DRUGS
HAs AF CrED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARmACEUnCAL INDUnSRY ch. 1, at 3
(1998) [hereinafter INCREASED COMPETITION]. This report is available electronically,
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B. The Health Care System Before 1984
1. Drug Regulation
Drug regulation as we now think of it began in 1938 with the
passage of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). 20 Be-
cause of the "Elixir Sulfanilamide" scandal which occurred during its
drafting,2' one of the FFDCA's innovations was to distinguish between
prescription drugs and those that could be sold over-the-counter. 22
This development, coinciding with the discovery of revolutionary
medicines such as penicillin, triggered a dramatic growth in the
pharmaceuticals industry.23
Although the original FFDCA increased the FDA's role in drug
approval, 24 the premarket approval system in force today was actually
created by amendments to the FFDCA, passed in 1962.25 Under the
through the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) webpage, (visited Jan. 15, 1999)
<http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=655&sequence=O&from=l>, and in
hardbound form (pagination may differ between the versions; all citations herein re-
fer to the electronic pages). The effect of competition from me-too drugs on prices
can be complex. In examining the price trends of pioneer and me-too drugs over
time, the CBO found that pioneer prices increased at a rate just over inflation even
after me-too introduction in four out of five drug classes. The CBO suggests that
competition from me-too drugs does not drive down prices as one might expect be-
cause of doctors' increased familiarity with the pioneer as compared with the me-too,
or by me-too manufacturers increasing prices to levels comparable to those of pio-
neers after only a short time in the market. See id. ch. 3, at 9.
20 Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301-95 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996)).
21 The Elixir Sulfanilamide scandal occurred between the start of drafting in
1933 and the FFDCA's passage in 1938. One hundred people in Tennessee died after
ingesting an untested drug which contained diethylene glycol, an organic solvent. See
Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA.
L. REV. 1753, 1761 (1996). Under the laws at the time, manufacturers were not re-
quired to test new drugs for safety, but the FDA prosecuted the Massengill Company,
maker of the drug, under a false advertising theory and won damages of $26,100. See
Susan Kopp Keyack, Note, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984: Is It a Healthy Long Term Solution, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 147, 150 n.26 (1990).
22 See Keyack, supra note 21, at 151.
23 See id. at 151-52 & n.31 (citing statistics indicating a seven-fold increase in drug
sales between 1938 and 1958).
24 See Merrill, supra note 21, at 1761-64.
25 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). The creation of these amendments was
also spawned by a medical scandal, this time involving the sedative Thalidomide,
which caused birth defects in the children of pregnant women who took the drug.
The majority of the cases were in European countries, as the drug had only been
approved for clinical trials in the United States. See Merrill, supra note 21, at 1764 &
n.35; Keyack, supra note 21, at 152 & n.34.
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1938 system, manufacturers merely notified the FDA before a new
drug was marketed; the FDA had a given period in which to raise any
objection, otherwise the drug could be placed on the market. In con-
trast, the 1962 amendments gave the FDA the power to examine the
safety and efficacy of new drugs, to have a voice in how the clinical
trials used to measure those variables were performed, and ultimately
to approve or reject the sale of new drugs based on the results.2 6
These broad powers remained intact through the Act's passage in
1984, with one minor exception. The Orphan Drug Amendments
27
targeted "orphan," or relatively uncommon, diseases by offering tax
and market incentives to drug companies that might not otherwise
develop treatments for them because of their rarity.
28
2. Increasing Prices
The health care cost situation which faced Congress in 1984 was a
result of both the patent and drug regulatory laws as they existed until
that year, as well as the pressures these laws placed on the parties in
the medical marketplace. These parties included drug manufactur-
ers, both pioneer and generic (although they faced different pres-
sures), medical providers (doctors and hospitals), and patients (the
ultimate consumers). The combination of pressures and the parties'
corresponding reactions created a spiral of increasing costs and a si-
multaneous demand for lower costs, which ultimately led to formula-
tion of the Act.
Just after 1962, pioneer manufacturers found themselves in a
complicated position. The previous decade and a half had been a
boom time for the pharmaceutical industry, featuring short market
approval times and long periods in which to recoup drug develop-
ment costs. Together, these trends resulted in an average of fifty-
three new drugs marketed each year from 1955 to 1962.29 Following
the FFDCA amendments of 1962, however, the pioneer industry took
a step backwards. The new FDA controls, which mandated stricter
clinical trials and an elongated review period, reduced pioneer pro-
ductivity to an average of seventeen new drugs annually between 1963
and 1972,30 and to twelve in 1980.31 The pioneer companies thus
26 See Merrill, supra note 21, at 1764-66.
27 Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 26 U.S.C.).
28 See Merrill, supra note 21, at 1790-92 & nn.116-19.
29 See Keyack, supra note 21, at 152 & n.39.
30 See id.
31 See Ronald L. Desrosiers, Note, The Drug Patent Term: Longtime Battleground in
the Control of Health Care Costs, 24 Nr~v ENG. L. REv. 115, 124 (1989).
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faced two obstacles: increasing development costs due to the more
elaborate testing requirements, and decreasing returns as FDA ap-
proval consumed larger portions of the then seventeen year patent
term. As a result, following the 1962 amendments to the FFDCA, pio-
neer firms began to raise prices, become more aggressive in their pat-
ent protection,3 2 and lobby legislatures for statutory protection in the
form of "antisubstitution" laws.
33
Generic manufacturers faced a similar set of economic pres-
sures-at least in the area of drug development. Like the pioneers,
they too were burdened by FDA review times for their generic drugs.
But, because of the pioneers' patents, there was an extra delay in their
ability to get products into the marketplace; FDA review and approval
for generic products could not realistically begin until the brand
name drugs' patents lapsed. Additionally, although the active ingredi-
ents used in the generic drugs had already been tested and approved
by the FDA for the brand name companies, the generic manufactur-
ers were forced to run their own clinical trials before FDA review
could begin on the generic versions. The brand name trial results,
which could have saved the generic companies this time, effort, and
expense, were protected by trade secret laws.3 4 This situation,
although more attractive than the one confronting the pioneers, still
motivated generic manufacturers to begin clinical trials as early as pos-
sible and to lobby Congress for a reduction in the patent term.35
Doctors and hospitals, the intermediaries in the medical market-
place, did nothing to ameliorate the situation. Unlike managed care
programs which predominate today and often dictate which drugs can
32 See Keyack, supra note 21, at 152-53. After slumping in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, the number of civil suits by pioneer companies have increased, indicating
that they are once again becoming aggressive in protecting their intellectual property.
This trend may be attributable to the effects of ever-increasing competition. See infra
Part IV.A.2. See generally Richard Korman, Lo! Here Come the Technology Patents. Lo! Here
Come the Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 27, 1998, § 3, at 4.
33 State legislatures responded to pioneer manufacturer pressure by passing "an-
tisubstitution" statutes that prohibited generic substitution by pharmacists. See
Keyack, supra note 21, at 153 n.42. Meanwhile, the pioneer companies also lobbied
Congress, arguing that the patent term was too short. See Ralph A. Lewis, Comment,
The Emerging Effects of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 8
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 361, 362 (1992).
34 See INCREASED COMPETITON, supra note 19, Summary, at 4.
35 See Keyack, supra note 21, at 153-55. Adding to the motivation for the generic
drug companies was the fact that the patents on several popular and extremely profit-
able drugs, including the analgesic Motrin and sedatives Valium and Haldol, would
expire between 1984 and 1987. See id. at 154 n.57.
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or should be prescribed, 36 care givers before 1984 were often unaware
of drug costs or generic drug availability.3 7 As a result of this "igno-
rance," and a desire to avoid malpractice claims, doctors in this period
often ordered tests and treatments which, while not completely un-
called for, were only moderately or slightly informative. This trend
increased health care costs overall.
As a result of these trends, patients-the ultimate consumers in
the medical marketplace-faced steadily increasing costs after the
1962 amendments took effect. In response to these higher prices the
public called for legislative change, and state legislators responded by
repealing the antisubstitution laws.38 This reaction, however, in-
creased the pressure on pioneer companies even further, and proba-
bly exacerbated competition between the pioneer and generic
companies.
In 1983, these tensions spilled into the courtroom. Roche Prod-
ucts, Inc. (Roche), a pioneer company and the holder of patent for
the sedative Dalmane, filed suit against Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. (Bo-
lar), a generic manufacturer, claiming that Bolar had begun its
36 As Increased Competition describes, managed care has significantly changed the
pharmaceutical market. While many different kinds of managed care organizations
exist, they operate on the general idea that by gathering large groups of customers
and reducing the use of high cost services, the organizations can, in effect, negotiate
"volume discounts" from doctors and hospitals. Many plans have now also affiliated
with pharmaceutical benefit management companies (PBMs), which, again by offer-
ing a volume of customers, negotiate with pharmacies for lower prices. PBMs furnish
the pharmacies with "formularies," lists of drugs which are preferred for the plan. To
keep costs down, these formularies often specify the substitution of generic drugs for
brand names. This system is complicated by the fact that many brand name compa-
nies have now begun giving PBMs discounts or rebates in order to be included in
their formularies. Another confounding factor is that while drugs are expensive, hos-
pital and doctor treatment is even more so, and as a result, managed care patients
may actually receive more prescription drugs than non-managed care patients in an-
other effort to reduce costs. See generally INCREASED COMPE=ITION, supra note 19, ch. 2,
at 1-9. Needless to say, as the number of people in such plans increases (26% of full-
time workers in medium to large businesses were enrolled in managed care plans in
1988 as compared to 61% in 1995), the effect of such plans will also increase. See
Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, BLS Reports on Employee Benefits in Medium
and Large Private Establishments, 1995 (press release, July 25, 1997), cited in INCREASED
COMPErrIoN, supra note 19, ch. 2, at 1.
37 See David A. Balto, A Whole New World?: Pharmaceutical Responses to the Managed
Care Revolution, 52 FooD & DRUG L.J. 83, 83 (1997).
38 See Keyack, supra note 21, at 153 n.42. In addition to public pressure, the
repeal of antisubstitution laws was also motivated by an FTC study about drug prices
in the early 1980s. See Balto, supra note 37, at 83.
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clinical trials before the Dalmane patent expired 9 At trial, the dis-
trict court denied injunctive relief, holding that Bolar, which had con-
ceded its possession and testing of Dalmane's active ingredient, had
not violated Roche's patent because its actions could not "be con-
nected with any act of competition or profit during the term of the
patent. '40 On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia reversed,41 flatly rejecting both Bolar's definition of
"use," as well as its argument that public policy favoring generic drugs
merited an exception to the wording of § 271 (a). The court
grounded this holding in its belief that "Bolar's intended 'experimen-
tal' use [wa] s solely for business reasons."
42
Instead of breaking new legal ground, Roche merely confirmed
what most believed to be the law concerning drug patents-that is,
generic manufacturers could not begin clinical testing until the pio-
neer companies' patents expired, because such an action constituted
a prohibited use of the product. The case illustrated the frustrations
of both sides of the industry, however, and this led both groups, along
with consumer advocates, to pressure Congress for a solution.
C. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
In response to industry lobbying and public pressure, in 1983
Congress approached the dilemma facing the pharmaceutical indus-
try. Acknowledging complaints from generic manufacturers and cost-
cutting advocates, the House of Representatives considered a bill to
shorten the application and approval procedures for generic drugs. 43
Simultaneously, both houses of Congress also introduced legislation
to restore patent protection time lost during FDA approval to pioneer
drugs.44 Once legislators realized that neither measure had enough
support to pass individually,45 the two ideas were combined.
46
39 Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 572 F. Supp. 255 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd
733 F.2d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Roche claimed Bolar's actions were a violation of
§ 271 (a) of the patent code, which provides, "Whoever without authority makes, uses
or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent
therefor, infringes the patent." 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) (Supp. 111996).
40 Roche Prods., 572 F. Supp. at 257.
41 733 F.2d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
42 Id. at 863.
43 See Lewis, supra note 33, at 361-62 & n.7.
44 See id. at 362-63.
45 See id. at 363.
46 The Act as passed contained three sections. Titles I and II had significance for
the pharmaceutical industry, while Title III of the Act dealt with textile labeling.
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Based on its design as a compromise measure, certain aspects of
the Act benefitted each side of the drug industry. In order to increase
access to generic drugs, and thus lower costs, Title I of the Act signifi-
cantly altered 21 U.S.C. § 355, part of the FFDCA, creating an innova-
tive process for obtaining "abbreviated new drug approval" (ANDA).47
Under this new system, any party meeting the statutory conditions
could file an ANDA and would receive an answer from the FDA within
180 days.48 The conditions were specifically tailored to fit the generic
drug industry: they essentially required an informational showing that
the ANDA drug was similar or identical in all important respects to a
pre-existing, FDA-approved drug, and a certification that the new
drug would not infringe upon any pre-existing drug's patent.49 Tite I
47 SeePub. L. No. 98-417, § 101, 98 Stat. 1585, 1585-92 (1984) (current version at
21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
48 See § 101, 98 Stat. at 1588-89 (codified as amended at § 355 () (5) (A) (1994 &
Supp. III 1997)).
49 The original version of 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2) provided in relevant part:
(A) An abbreviated application for a new drug shall contain-
(i) information to show that the conditions of use pre-
scribed . . . have been previously approved for [another]
drug...;
(ii) (I) if the . . . drug referred to in clause (i) has only one active
ingredient, information to show that the active ingredient of
the new drug is the same as that of the listed drug;
(iii) information to show that the route of administration, the dos-
age form, and the strength of the new drug are the same as
those of the listed drug... ;
(iv) information to show that the new drug is bioequivalent to the
listed drug... and the new drug can be expected to have the
same therapeutic effect as the listed drug... ;
(v) information to show that the labeling proposed for the new
drug is the same . . . except for changes required be-
cause... the new drug and the listed drug are produced or
distributed by different manufacturers;
(vi) [information about the components, manufacturing, process-
ing, packaging, labeling of the new drug];
(vii) a certification... with respect to each patent[ed drug] ...
(I) that such patent information has not been filed,
(II) that such patent has expired,
(III) of the date on which such patent will expire, or
(IV) that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug... ; and
(viii) if with respect to the listed drug . . . information was
filed.., for a method of use patent which does not claim a use
for which the applicant is seeking approval .... a statement
that the.., patent does not claim such a use.
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of the Act also established grounds for rejecting an ANDA or with-
drawing ANDA approval in the interests of safety.50 Furthermore, Ti-
tie II of the Act amended the patent code to address the Roche
controversy about generic clinical trials. Section 271 on patent in-
fringement was rewritten, so that generic companies could manufac-
ture and use patented products or methods solely for the purpose of
meeting federal regulations regarding market approval. 51
The provisions designed to benefit the pioneer industry, and
thereby encourage innovation, were slightly different. Title I of the
Act provided a limited amount of market exclusivity for nonpatented
drugs.52 Additionally, Title II added section 156, which allows the
holder of a patent on certain products to extend the term of patent
protection in order to recoup some of the time lost in testing and
§ 101, 98 Stat. at 1585-86 (amended 1992, 1997) (emphasis added). The definitions
of "bioequivalent" and a related term, "bioavailability" were provided elsewhere in the
statute. Bioavailability is defined as "the rate and extent to which the active ingredi-
ent ... is absorbed.., and becomes available at the site of drug action," while bioe-
quivalence requires a "show[ing] that the active ingredients of the new drug are of
the same pharmacological or therapeutic class as those of the listed
drug ... and.., can be expected to have the same therapeutic effect," or a condition
where "the rate and extent of absorption of the drug do not show a significant differ-
ence from ... [those] of the listed drug when administered at the same molar dose of
the therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental conditions . . . ." § 101, 98
Stat. at 1592 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
These definitions would later be scrutinized when questions arose about generic drug
quality. See infra Part III.A-B.
Note that if the pre-existing drug's patent had expired (or if the drug was not
patented), the FDA approval was immediately effective; otherwise, the approval be-
came effective at the expiration of the patent. See § 101, 98 Stat. at 1588-89 (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(0) (5) (B) (i), (iii) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
50 See id. § 102(a) (3), (b) (3)-(4), 98 Stat. at 1593 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 355(d), (e) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
51 See id. § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, at 1603 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)
(Supp. 111996)). This provided that "mak[ing], us[ing], or sell[ing] a patented in-
vention... solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs," is "not ... an act of infringement"; whereas, "it shall be an act of infringe-
ment.., to obtain approval... to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or
sale of a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent before the
expiration of such patent." Id.
52 See § 101, 98 Stat. at 1590-91 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355 0) (4) (D) (i)-(v) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)). For example, if the nonpatented
drug were approved betweenJanuary 1, 1982 and September 24, 1984 (the date of the
Act's enactment), it would receive ten years of market exclusivity before an ANDA on
the product could become effective. There were additional time periods ranging
from two to five years given to nonpatented drugs under varying circumstances. See
[VOL- 75:1
NOTE: GENERIC DRUG PRICE SCANDAL
approval.5 3 While this benefit sounds sweeping, it came with many
restrictions. Only certain products, including drugs, medical devices,
and certain additives, qualify for the extension due to their FDA re-
view.54 Also, the extension is only granted if certain conditions are
met,55 and even then, the extension only applies to the specific uses
approved for the original product.5 6 Furthermore, the duration of
the extension is not necessarily equal to the time required for ap-
proval; instead, it is calculated via a statutory formula5 7 which includes
one half of the clinical testing time plus the time of FDA review. But,
the extension itself cannot be more than five years, and the resulting
patent protection cannot be greater than fourteen years after FDA
approval.5
8
Overall, the passage of the Act in 1984 was met with considerable
optimism by its drafters, who viewed it as a clever compromise. Sena-
tor Hatch summarized this perspective when he said that the Act cre-
ated "a finely tuned balance" between its two seemingly conflicting
53 See id. § 201, 98 Stat, at 1598-1603 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 156
(1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
54 See § 201, 98 Stat. at 1600 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 156(f) (1) (1994
& Supp. III 1997)).
55 The conditions for patent extension include,
(1) the term of the patent has not expired before an application... for
its extension;
(2) the term.., has never been extended;
(3) an application for extension is submitted ... in accordance with the
requirements... ;
(4) the product has been subject to a regulatory review... ;
(5) (A) except as ... in... (B), the permission for the commercial market-
ing or use... after such regulatory review... is the first permitted
commercial marketing or use... under the.., law... which [re-
quires] such regulatory review; or
(B) in the case of a patent which claims a method of manufactur-
ing... which primarily uses recombinant DNA... the permission
for the commercial marketing or use ... after such regulatory re-
view... is the first permitted.., under the process claimed in the
patent.
§ 201, 98 Stat. at 1598 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 156(a) (1994 & Supp. III
1997)).
56 See id. (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 156(b) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
57 See § 201, 98 Stat. at 1598-99 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 156(c) (1994 &
Supp. III 1997)).
58 See id.; INCRASED CoMPETIrroN, supra note 19, ch. 4, at 1-5. According to the
CBO, clinical trials usually require six to eight years, while FDA approval generally
takes two more. The CBO believes that it is the 14 year limitation that is the most
restrictive on patents, as most products that would qualify for almost the full five years
on average receive only three because of the cap. See id.
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goals: cost containment through increased generic availability, and
encouragement of innovation through patent restoration.5 9 In reality,
however, the generic manufacturers essentially received everything
they could hope for-a streamlined approval process, decreased pro-
duction costs (because of their new ability to rely on the results of
pioneers' clinical testing), and a shortened time to the marketplace
(since required testing could now be performed while the original
drug remained under patent). Conversely, the pioneer companies
achieved only one of their goals, an increase in the patent term, which
was not even as substantial as they had hoped. Additionally, they now
faced increased competition from the burgeoning generic industry.
Neither side, however, could predict the challenges which would face
the Act in the coming years.
II. CHALLENGES TO THE DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT
TERM RESTORATION ACT
Just after the Act's passage, the new system appeared to work ex-
actly as envisioned. In the first eight months after its implementation,
the FDA received almost five hundred ANDAs.60 Simultaneously, ge-
neric drug manufacturers, many of which had been smaller special-
ized companies, experienced tremendous economic growth almost
overnight. 61 Generic drugs became so profitable that many pioneer
companies began producing their own generics or established subsidi-
aries to produce them.6 2 As generic drugs consumed an increasing
portion of the market share, the extent of the financial savings cre-
ated by the Act surprised both legislators and the public;63 both would
59 See William Christiansen II, Comment, Patent Term Extension of Pharmaceuticals
in Japan: So You Say You Want to Rush That Generic Drug to Market in Japan .... Good
Luck!, 6 PAC. RiM L. & POL'YJ. 613, 616 (1997).
60 See Sari Horwitz, New Law Stimulating Generic-Drug Market; Certification Process
Simplified, WASH. POST, June 28, 1985, at Bi.
61 See Lewis, supra note 33, at 367. Lewis details the growth of Mylan, today the
second largest generic drug manufacturer in the world, which experienced a 166%
growth in profits and an 800% growth in its stock price over an eighteen month pe-
riod. See id.
62 See INCREASED COMPETITION, supra note 19, ch. 3, at 22-24.
63 The FTC reported that in 1984, the Act's first year, Americans substituted ge-
neric drugs for a name-brand equivalent on approximately 15% of prescriptions, yet
that change saved approximately $130 million. See Generic Drugs Save $130 Million,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1986, at 1. Estimates of the Act's savings potential before passage
had only predicted a savings of one billion dollars over 12 years. See, e.g., Lewis, supra
note 33, at 366; Molly Sinclair, FDA Lets SomeDrugs TakeEffect Slowly, WASH. PosT,June
8, 1984, at A21.
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also be shocked at the challenges and revelations of the next few
years.
A. FDA Crisis
By 1987, fewer name brand drugs faced patent expiration, and
the generic boom tapered. This, in turn, promoted rivalry and com-
petition between the generic drug manufacturers. 64 During that year,
some generic companies, including Mylan, experienced problems ob-
taining ANDA approval. When Mylan's complaints to the FDA went
unheeded, Mylan hired a private investigator to discover whether
competitors had illegally influenced the FDA.65 When the detective
found incriminating evidence of payoffs in the garbage of Charles
Chang, the chemist in charge of the FDA's generic drug division, he
instigated what would become a six year federal investigation. 66 My-
lan presented the evidence to the House Energy and Commerce Sub-
committee on Oversight and Investigations (the Subcommittee).
And, in 1988, the Subcommittee's own inquiry led to an initial round
of charges and convictions of FDA officials, drug firms, and their
executives.
67
64 See Sandra Skowron, Generic Drug Probe Still Going Strong, CHI. TRm., Nov. 22,
1992, § 7, at 13A. While Skowron estimated that there were approximately 350 ge-
neric drug manufacturers, she noted that 30 to 50 companies were the most powerful.
See id. This generally agrees with CBO estimates, which describe the generic drug
market as "not particularly concentrated," with Mylan and Geneva, the two largest
companies, combining to account for almost 30% of all generic drug sales in 1994,
while other firms had 1% to 5% each. See INCREASED CoMPETrrroN, supra note 19, ch.
3, at 24. Despite the overall similarity in numbers, the generic market may have
changed players between 1992 and 1994, as Skowron estimated that 60% of the ge-
neric drugs were made by pioneer firms or their subsidiaries, while the CBO attrib-
utes only 46% of 1994 total sales to pioneers and pioneer subsidiaries and suggests
that the proportion has decreased even further. See INCREASED COMpErrION, supra
note 19, ch. 3, at 21-24; Skowron, supra note 64, at 13A. In addition to an unconcen-
trated market with a large number of opposing firms, competition between generics is
inspired by the higher profits which can be reaped by the first generic manufacturer
to reach the market with a given product. Several studies have shown that generic
prices decline steadily as the number of manufacturers increase. The CBO suggests
that this effect is caused by the economic theory of price dampening; due to the
inherent lack of distinctiveness between generic drugs, demand is spread evenly
among any products in the market, causing intense price competition. See INCREASED
ConMPETIIoN, supra note 19, ch. 3, at 31-34.
65 See Lewis, supra note 33, at 369.
66 See Skowron, supra note 64, at 13AK
67 The FDA officials included Chang, who pled guilty to racketeering, and three
of his subordinates. Chang also pled guilty to perjury, and cooperated with investiga-
tors regarding his acceptance of almost $20,000 from five different companies in ex-
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The scandal continued, however. Investigators from the Depart-
ments of Justice and Health and Human Services discovered that not
only had drug companies used cash and gifts to sway FDA officials, but
some had also submitted fraudulent data with their ANDAs.68 Most
shockingly, some generic companies had taken name brand drugs, re-
packaged them as samples of their own products, and submitted them
for bioequivalency tests. 69 This "dismal picture" of "corruption,
fraud,... and.., malpractice" 70 led Representative John Dingell (D,
Michigan), Chairman of the Subcommittee, to conclude that "no one
at the FDA knows the composition, much less the bioavailability, of
the medicine . . .sold to the unsuspecting public."' 71 He also pro-
nounced the generic drug industry to be "the most pervasively corrupt
[industry] this subcommittee has ever uncovered. '7
2
As a result of the scandal, thirty individuals and nine drug compa-
nies were found guilty or admitted their role in FDA corruption. 73
The largest corporate offender was the defendant from the Roche case,
Bolar. The government fined Bolar ten million dollars and Bolar paid
another forty million dollars to settle with SmithKline Beecham,
whose blood pressure drug, Dyazide, Bolar had copied.74 In addition,
one of Bolar's founders was convicted on fraud and antitrust charges,
fined $1.25 million, and sentenced to five years in prison.
75
Despite the many negative acts involved in the FDA scandal, some
positive changes resulted from them. As the scandal broke, the FDA
reduced its approval rate for new generic drugs to a standstill, not
resuming a normal pace until 1991.76 Appalled by the "substantial
evidence... [of] significant corruption" at the FDA77 and spurred on
change for preferable treatment. See Lewis, supra note 33, at 369-70 & n.69;
Skowron, supra note 64, at 13A.
68 See Skowron, supra note 64, at 13A; Paul W. Valentine, More Indictments Expected
in Generic Drug Probe, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1990, at A4.
69 See Lewis, supra note 33, at 370 & n.70.
70 See Valentine, supra note 68, at A4.
71 Lewis, supra note 33, at 370.
72 Valentine, supra note 68, at A4.
73 See Milt Freudenheim, Bolar Co-Founder Receives a 5-Year Sentence for Fraud, N.Y.
TuMEs, Jan. 23, 1993, § 1, at 37. It should be noted that these figures include only
those that had serious legal action taken against them. At one point during the scan-
dal, sources on the Subcommittee revealed to reporters that, "of 39 generic drug com-
panies [investigated], . . . only about a half dozen appear free of criminal or
regulatory taint." Valentine, supra note 68, at A4.
74 See Freudenheim, supra note 73, at 37.
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 Pub. L. No. 102-282, § l(c), 106 Stat. 149, 149 (1992).
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by Representative Dingell, Congress approved the Generic Drug En-
forcement Act of 1992 (GDEA).78 The GDEA provided the FDA with
punitive weapons against persons and corporations79 abusing the drug
regulatory system. The sanctions imposed under the GDEA include
debarment,80 denial or withdrawal of product approval,81 suspension
of product distribution,8 2 and the possibility of civil penalties.83 Fur-
thermore, the criticism surrounding the scandal seemed to energize
the FDA in its role as a regulatory agency, to the point where one drug
company official remarked "everybody [in the drug industry] is scared
to death about the FDA [because] they know the FDA means
business."
84
B. Medical Questions About Generic Drugs
A related controversy about the quality of generic drugs also
emerged during the FDA crisis in the late 1980s. Like other generic
products, generic drugs combine the active ingredient of the original
name brand drug with different minor components and packaging.
Butjust as users may find a generic dish soap to be less effective than a
name brand, doctors began to question the medical effectiveness of
generic drugs.
78 Pub. L. No. 102-282, 106 Stat. 149 (1992) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355a
(1994)).
79 Professor Fleder notes that the GDEA distinguishes between individuals and
business entities for purposes of debarment and suggests that piercing the corporate
veil is within the FDA's powers under the GDEA. SeeJohn Fleder, The History, Provi-
sions, and Implementation of the Generic Drug Enforcement Act of 1992, 49 FOOD & DRUG
LJ. 89, 92 & n.22 (1994).
80 See 21 U.S.C. § 335a (1994). The effect of debarment is defined by § 335a(c)
to be a condition where the FDA will "not accept or review ... [ANDAs] submitted by
or with the assistance of a person debarred." § 335a(c) (A). Section 335a(a) provides
for mandatory, permanent debarment of individuals and business entities that have
been convicted of felonies relating to ANDA approval so long as debarment proceed-
ings are initiated within five years of the conviction, while (b) gives the Secretary of
Health and Human Services the discretion to debar individuals and business entities
for no more than five years for conduct relating to ANDA approval that results in a
misdemeanor conviction, an aiding or abetting or conspiracy conviction, or even no
conviction at all. See § 335a(a), (b), (c) (2). The code also provides for permissive
debarment of "any high managerial agent," i.e., officers, directors, partners, or other
employees or agents, who either worked or consulted with an individual who was
debarred, had knowledge or avoided knowledge of the other's illegalities, or did not
report illegal activity. § 335a(b) (2) (B) (iv).
81 See id. §§ 335a(f), 335c.
82 See § 335a(g).
83 See id. § 335b.
84 Skowron, supra note 64, at 13A.
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As detailed in Part II, for an ANDA to be approved by the FDA
under the Act as originally passed, its manufacturer had to demon-
strate, with respect to the composition of the drug: 1) that the active
ingredient was the same as in the previously approved name brand;
8 5
2) that the "route of administration, the dosage form, and the
strength" of the new drug was the same;86 and 3) that the new drug
was bioequivalent to the preexisting drug.8 7 Just after the Act's pas-
sage in 1984, some of the name brand manufacturers petitioned the
FDA and launched an advertising campaign, claiming generic drugs
were not as effective as the pioneer products.88 For the most part,
however, the public and the government dismissed these claims as
merely the protestations of the frustrated pioneer companies, which
had lost more than they had gained under the Act's "compromise."89
In the late 1980s, however, doctors' groups also began to ques-
tion whether the Act's bioequivalency standards for generic drugs suf-
ficiently guaranteed effectiveness and patient safety. 90 In part, this
was a response to the discovery of illegalities and sample substitutions
during the FDA scandal. But physicians also questioned the quality of
generic drugs approved without any irregularities. In 1989, a study by
the American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP) found that the
inactive components of some generic drugs could increase or reduce
the body's uptake by as much as forty percent.9 ' Doctors considered
this difference especially significant for "critical-dose" drugs, with
which small changes in amount can have large physiological conse-
quences, such as anticoagulants (blood thinners), sex and thyroid
hormones, and many kinds of heart medications. 92 As a result of
these findings, the AAFP urged doctors not to prescribe generic drugs
for patients who were considered to have the highest risk of problems,
85 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2) (A) (ii) (1994).
86 § 355(j)(2)(A)(iii).
87 See § 355(j) (2) (A) (iv); see also supra note 49 discussing the definition of
bioequivalence.
88 See Horwitz, supra note 60, at B2. In particular, Hoffman-LaRoche, the maker
of Valium, petitioned the FDAjust before its patent expired, claiming test results that
showed generic forms of the drug did not work as well as Valium itself. See id.
89 See id. Some legislators also criticized the pioneer companies' efforts, includ-
ing Democratic Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (Ohio) and Rep. Waxman, who called the
pioneers' claims "false and misleading." Lewis, supra note 33, at 368.
90 See Tim Friend, Growth in Generic Drugs: Experts Want to Limit Use of Generic
Drugs, USA TODAY, Aug. 8, 1989, at lA.
91 See id.
92 See Kathleen Doheny, Generic Drugs-Just As Good As Brand Names , L.A. TIMES,
July 18, 1995, at E3.
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including the elderly, asthmatics, diabetics, and those with heart
trouble.93
Although the FDA and generic drug manufacturers denied the
problems suggested by the AAFP's study,94 the government eventually
revamped the FDA's procedures for reviewing generic drug quality
prior to approval. While the statutory definitions of bioequivalence
and bioavailability remained intact,95 the FDA did revise the federal
regulations governing ANDA approval. In particular, the new regula-
tions clarified acceptable testing procedures and considered a wider
variety of drug types in designing its testing structure.
96
C. Problems with GATT
In 1994, the United States, in order to further its multinational
trading partnerships, participated in the GATT Uruguay Round nego-
tiations. One of the many objectives of these trade talks was to create
uniform protection for intellectual property within all World Trade
Organization countries.97 As part of the accord reached at the talks,
member nations signed the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), which required patents to be
protected for a period of twenty years, beginning at the filing date of
the patent application. 98 To implement this agreement, Congress
passed the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), amending
the patent code.99
As noted in Part II, the patent protection granted in the United
States had always been seventeen years, measured from the time the
patent was granted by the PTO. While the URAA represented a signif-
icant change for all technical industries, it was especially so for the
pharmaceutical industry. Parts II and III discussed the controversy
over the loss of patent protection to FDA approval time. The passage
93 See Friend, supra note 90, at 1A.
94 See id.
95 See 21 U.S.CA. § 3550) (8) (West Supp. 1998); see also supra note 49.
96 The current regulations regarding bioequivalence and drug regulation are
contained in 21 C.F.R. §§ 314, 320 (1998) and were last revised in 1998. For a discus-
sion of the previous regulations, and the proposals the FDA considered in making its
changes, see 57 Fed. Reg. 17,950-18,001 (1992).
97 See Michelle Marks, The Impact of the Patent Term Provisions of the 1994 Uruguay
Round Agreements Act on the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 51
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 445, 446 (1996).
98 See id.
99 Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§ 154 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
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of the URAA created yet another temporal obstacle for pioneer manu-
facturers to overcome.1 0 0
While the effect of the new URAA term was clear as to drugs
which had not yet entered the patent process,10 ' the question of how
to implement the URAA in regard to currently existing patents re-
mained. After launching several proposals on how to deal with this
situation, the PTO issued its final position, which held that patents in
force when the URAA took effect were entitled to either: 1) seventeen
years of protection, measured from the time of issuance, with the pos-
sibility of restoration under the Act, or 2) twenty years from the earli-
est filing date, without the possibility of restoration, whichever was
longer.
10 2
As one might expect, this ruling led to considerable amounts of
litigation.10 3 While the complicated details of these cases are unneces-
sary for this discussion, the events surrounding GATT and the URAA
are important in two respects. First, they represented a substantial
departure from the existing patent system, in that they changed both
the patent term as well as the way it is calculated. Second, and more
importantly, the passage of the URAA was another legislative action
which signified insensitivity to the needs of the pioneer
manufacturers.
D. 1996 Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings
The result of the Senate Judiciary Committee's (the Committee)
1996 hearings were foreshadowed by Senator Orrin Hatch's opening
100 As Marks describes, the changing of the starting point for patent protection
would have no net effect if the term is measured from the time of the last-filed appli-
cation and the PTO takes exactly three years to issue the patent. See Marks, supra note
97, at 447-48. Neither of these assumptions is justified, however, as 35 U.S.C. § 154
(1994 & Supp. III 1997) dictates that the patent term begins running at the date a
patent is first filed, and when one disregards patent applications which are aban-
doned, the average time for patent issuance by the PTO is greater than three years.
See id. Because these assumptions fail, the URAA effectively shortens the patent term
available for pioneer manufacturers.
101 The URAA by its own terms became effective on June 8, 1995. See Pub. L. No.
103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994 & Supp.
III 1997)).
102 See Determination of New Expiration Dates of Certain Patents, 60 Fed. Reg.
30,069 (1995).
103 For an award-winning review of three such cases, see Marks, supra note 97, at
456-50, in which she analyzes in detail Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir.
1996), Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Royce Laboratories, Inc., 69 F.3d 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
and DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 62 F.3d 1397 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (per curiam).
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remarks: "[A] t the time of its passage, [the Act] was called the most
important consumer bill of the decade and I think that that statement
is still true today.1 04 Although Senator Hatch went on to pose the
question, "If we placed our 'legislator's level' on the Hatch-Waxman
Act today, would it still be in balance?" the answer, so far as the Com-
mittee was concerned, was never in doubt.105
The Act's coauthor and the hearings' first witness, Representative
Henry Waxman, echoed Senator Hatch's praise of the Act's effective-
ness, saying, "I consider... the very positive results that have occurred
as a result of [the Act] ... among my proudest achievements.... We
had the right balance then and we have had the results we hoped
for ... "1 0 He went on to justify his feelings for the Act primarily
with cost-savings statistics. 107 As for the state of innovation stimula-
tion, Representative Waxman commented that "we have achieved
[cost containment] without undermining our second goal of assuring
a patent period that successfully encourages research and develop-
ment," a claim which he supported only with data that research and
development expenditures had "increased dramatically since the Act
was passed."' 0
8
The Committee went on to hear the testimony of several generic
drug industry representatives, who, as expected, were less than impar-
tial regarding the Act. They maintained that the Act, "ain't broke,"
and "doesn't need fixing," and characterized criticism of the Act as
merely the "importuning of some brand name drug companies."'0 9
In defense of their position, they, like Representative Waxman, al-
luded primarily to cost-savings provided by generic drugs." 0 They
also complimented Congress's bipartisan support of the Act's "grand
compromise" which, in their opinion, had "balance [d] those very gen-
erous benefits to the brands... [by giving the generic companies] two
basic rights: [a] speeded up and simplified processing of generic ap-
plications .. . [and the ability] to prepare for and achieve FDA ap-
104 Pharmaceutical Patent Issues: Interpreting GATT: Hearings on S. 1277 Before the Sen-
ateJudiciay Comm., 104th Cong. 93 (1998) (prepared statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
105 Id. at 94.
106 Pharmaceutical Patent Issues: Interpreting GATT: Hearings on S. 1277 Before the Sen-
ateJudiciary Comm., 104th Cong. 96 (1998) (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman).
107 See id. at 96-97.
108 Id. at 97.
109 Pharmaceutical Patent Issues: Interpreting GATT: Hearings on S. 1277 Before the Sen-
ate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. 101 (1998) (prepared statement ofJohn Klein, Chair-
man, Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association, and Tom Russlo, Vice-Chairman,
National Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers).
110 See id. at 105.
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proval during the patent period." ' In referring to this second right,
the generic representatives also jibed the D.C. Circuit and its Roche
decision, describing Congress's action as "a ratification of what
most.., had thought was the rule."
11 2
This testimony was followed by that of Gerald Mossinghoff, Presi-
dent of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA), representing the pioneer companies. After conceding the
successes of the generic industry in cost containment,15 Mossinghoff
went on to detail the decreases in incentives for pharmaceutical inno-
vation under the Act, saying that " [t]he dilemma is that although
pharmaceuticals are extremely expensive and difficult to develop, they
can be copied cheaply and easily."114 While concurring with Repre-
sentative Waxman's statistics regarding the increases in research ex-
penditures, Mossinghoff had a much different analysis of the trend;
instead of representing an increase in development fostered by the
Act, he contended that it merely represented how "expensive and
risky" research had become. 1 5 After discussing how strong patent
protection is directly related to an encouragement of innovation,11 6
Mossinghoff summarized by noting the history of health improvement
caused by drug development and the promising potential created by
recent scientific advances, but concluded that these goals would only
be reached if innovation continued."
17
After listening to the views from each side of the industry, the
Committee heard from several witnesses representing different coali-
tions concerned about the Act and pharmaceutical prices. An official
from the biotechnology giant Genentech spoke, as did consumer ex-
perts from the Alliance for Aging Research and the Gray Panthers.
Henry Grabowski, a noted economist, also testified regarding the mar-
ket effects of the Act; like those before him, he maintained that "[i]n
terms of facilitating generic competition, the Act ha[d] clearly been a
111 Id. at 104.
112 Id. (emphasis added).
113 See Pharmaceutical Patent Issues: Interpreting GAT: Hearings on S. 1277 Before the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. 120-23 (1998) (prepared statement of Gerald
Mossinghoff, President PhRMA). "[I]t is evident that, while the second objective
[cost control] has been accomplished, the first is in some jeopardy." Id. at 121.
114 Id. at 119.
115 Id.
116 Mossinghoff cited examples from the United States and abroad. The most
prominent American example was the Orphan Drug Act, which he credited with rais-
ing the number of drugs to treat rare diseases from ten in the decade before the law
to 99 in the decade following its passage. See id. at 119-20.
117 See id. at 127.
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tremendous success."' 18 However, Grabowski concurred with Mos-
singhoff that "[a]mong all high tech industries, [the] pharmaceuticals
[industry] is the one with the lowest ratio of imitation costs to innova-
tion costs .... ,1 19 As to the Act's effectiveness in stimulating innova-
tion, Grabowski concluded, "[T]he current rules on patent term
restoration have the undesirable feature that breakthrough prod-
ucts... will end up with below-average effective patent lifetimes....
This is a provision that warrants particular attention by
Congress .... "120
Near the end of the hearings, Senator Hatch admitted some am-
bivalence about the Act's balance. First he confessed that he "always
questioned the [patent term], whether that is enough .... "121 He
then quickly suggested, however, that any weaknesses were justified
because "we knew the consumers would be big winners if we could get
drugs off patents immediately into generic form."' 22 Although he
went on to concede that, "if we're going to wreck the innovative com-
panies and not put enough money into finding a cure for [serious
diseases,] . . . then we're not . . . doing a very good job," Senator
Hatch closed by "emphasiz[ing] that.., this hearing [is] a celebration
of Hatch-Waxman not a wake."' 23 Thus, the Committee made no sig-
nificant changes to the Act, and this was the last time that Congress
questioned whether there was a need for change.
IV. CuRRENT CoNDITmONS
As Part III of this Note details, the Act withstood several chal-
lenges between its passage in 1984 and the 1996 hearings which pro-
nounced its continuing viability. Of the Act's dual purposes,
stimulation of innovation and cost containment, the pre-1996 criti-
cisms focused solely on satisfaction of the first goal, stimulation of in-
novation. No one has disputed that generic drugs were more cost
effective than name brands, and the data supported that belief.124 To-
day, however, while the criticism of the Act's innovation stimulation
continues, it has been joined by another, more disturbing trend:
118 Pharmaceutical Patent Issues: Interpreting GAT. Hearings on S. 1277 Before the Sen-
ate Judiciay Comm., 104th Cong. 156 (1998) (prepared statement of Henry Grabowski,
Professor of Economics, Duke University).
119 Id. at 157.
120 Id.
121 Pharmaceutical Patent Issues: Interpreting GATT Hearings on S. 1277 Before the Sen-
ate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. 166 (1998) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
122 Id.
123 Id. at 167.
124 See supra Part III.D.
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problems with cost containment. This Section discusses both of these
criticisms in turn.
A. Dissatisfaction with Innovation Stimulation
To be sure, the pioneer drug companies have enjoyed tremen-
dous success in the United States. Domestic pharmaceutical compa-
nies developed almost half of the new medicinal products released
worldwide between 1970 and 1992, accumulating a half a billion dol-
lar trade surplus on sixty-nine billion dollars in revenues in 1993.125
However, the industry does face problems which are not remarkably
different than those articulated during the 1996 Senate hearings and
before the Act's passage in 1984. Three essential problems exist, each
begetting the next. Pioneer companies face (1) ever-increasing re-
search and development costs, which are exacerbated by (2) the limits
on their ability to protect intellectual property from competition,
which in turn decreases revenue, and (3) the litigation risks of compa-
nies producing potentially dangerous products, which increase
expenditures.
1. Research and Development Costs
The research and development required to create new drugs is
an inherent part of the industry; by definition, the pioneer companies
create, and it is only through numerous failed experiments and
projects that new, successful drugs are produced. The problem with
this reality, however, is that the cost of creating these new products is
steadily rising,126 for a variety of reasons.
The most obvious source of the increase in research costs is infla-
tion. Even if the same experiments were performed today as in 1960,
they would be more expensive. But the design of clinical trials has
also contributed to the increase in costs. Although the overall ap-
proach to clinical trials of drugs has not changed significantly over the
decades, 127 many recent changes in clinical testing involve the
125 See COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, ENDLESS FRONTIER, LIMITED REsOURcES app.
on pharmaceuticals, at 1 (last modified Aug. 13, 1996) <http://nii.nist~gov/pubs/
cocjrd/coc_rdapdx.txt> [hereinafter ENDLESS FRONTIER] (copy on file withJournal).
126 The U.S. Office of Technology Assessment estimated that in 1993 it took an
average of $359 million to introduce a single new drug into the marketplace. See id. at
2 & n.6. Niblack suggests an even higher figure of $400-$500 million. See John
Niblack, Why are Drug Development Programs Growing in Size and Cost? A View From Indus-
tiy, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 151, 151 (1997).
127 As Endless Frontier describes, " [m] ost of the industry's R&D efforts still proceed
in a fairly linear manner, with clearly defined stages, many of them determined by
law." ENDLESS FRONTIER, supra note 125, at 2. Initially, companies create new mole-
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number of subjects utilized in each phase of the trials. Sample sizes
have increased, sometimes dramatically, thus elevating the cost of the
testing, as each experiment must be replicated many more times. 128
Another root of spiraling costs for the pioneer industry is that the
goals of research have become more difficult to achieve. Genetic con-
ditions, ranging from baldness to cancer, virulent viruses such as HIV,
and antibiotic-resistant bacteria require more complex solutions than
the diseases treated previously.129 As the amount of scientific knowl-
edge expands, answers to the next iteration of questions become that
much harder to decipher. To combat these new obstacles, companies
are utilizing the latest in biotechnology and are hiring masses of scien-
tists and technicians. 30 These approaches require additional capital,
yet pioneer companies must constantly fight to keep prices low in or-
der to stay competitive.
One solution implemented by pioneer companies has been an
increased association with nonprofit research entities, such as univer-
sities. Academic researchers, commonly believed to pursue intellec-
tual rather than fiscally profitable projects, have faced their own
economic crisis as the availability of grant monies has decreased. l 31
cules in the hopes that some will have medicinal properties. A small number of the
new substances are selected for pre-clinical trials; these trials are performed either on
cell cultures or a series of animal models or both in order to test for potential toxicity
to humans. Following pre-clinical testing, chemicals are typically examined through
three phases of clinical testing: an initial phase, which tests dosage tolerance and
measures dosage effects on healthy humans, a second phase, utilizing a small number
of diseased patients to measure benefits and risks of the treatment, and a final phase,
where many more subjects are given the treatment in response to a wider range of
symptoms. See id.
128 For example, in tests of antimicrobials between 1978 and 1983, clinical trials
involved an average of 2000 subjects, whereas similar tests utilized an average of 3500
subjects between 1986 and 1990. Other studies have suggested that the number of
subjects required by the FDA increased 10 times over the years between 1979 and
1993. See id. at 5; see also Niblack, supra note 126, at 152.
129 See ENDL FRONTIER, supra note 125, at 5.
130 For example, research employment in 1991 had increased 27% since 1985.
Furthermore, almost two thirds of domestic personnel at pioneer companies are
scientists or professionals. The average expenditure per employee at these companies
rose over 10% between 1990 and 1991 to an amount over $135,000. See id. at 3.
131 Again, the data regarding grant funding are complicated. Many federal grant
institutions publish their funding rates and other data. See, e.g., NAT'L INSTS. OF
HEALTH, NIH ExTRAmuRAL DATA AND TRENDS, FiscAL YEARS 1986-95 (last modified
Nov. 26, 1996) http://www.nih.gov/grants/award/trends95/ANNOTATE.HTM; NA-
TIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, AwARD SIZE AND FUNDING RATE-NSF (visited Jan. 23,
1999) http://www.nsf.gov/home/grants/grantsawards.htm (copy on file with Jour-
nal). Although these agencies show only slight decreases in their funding rates dur-
ing the 1990s, the factor which has truly reduced the money available for academic
1999]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Therefore, partnership between these two philosophical opposites has
escalated, with some very positive results. However, some worry that
the expansion of this trend will ultimately be limited by either con-
flicts of interest, as competing pioneer companies attempt to align
with the same institutions, or conflicts of philosophy between busi-
ness-oriented researchers concerned about the bottom line and aca-
demics searching for knowledge regardless of the cost.
1 3 2
Other solutions have developed within the industry itself. Com-
panies frequently utilize "benchmarking," a technique which specifies
the maximum number of days a product can spend at any one stage of
development. 133 Furthermore, companies have become increasingly
cost-conscious regarding manufacturing and disposal costs, as litiga-
tion and regulations concerning environmental hazards have
multiplied.134
2. Competition
While early reviews of the Act summarized the effectiveness of its
patent extension provisions as "unclear,"13 5 we now have more hind-
sight with which to gauge its success. The average marketing period
of pioneer drugs still under patent protection has increased since the
passage of the Act from about nine years to eleven or twelve years. 136
But despite this success, at least two negative trends predominate.
First, despite the two to three year average increase in patent term, the
extensions have not proven to be as accessible or effective as originally
thought. Of the 101 drugs approved by the FDA between 1992 and
1995 eligible for an extension, only two-thirds of them have either
received extensions or have applications pending.1 37 The other third
were prevented from extending for a variety of reasons, but perhaps
research is the "indirect cost rate," the amount of each grant dollar which goes to
non-research related costs (examples include electricity, photocopies, support staff,
etc). As colleges and universities have increased these costs, the amounts actually
available to the scientists have dropped. At some universities, indirect costs have risen
to over 50%, meaning that for every dollar of grant money acquired by a researcher,
less than $0.50 will be used to cover actual research costs. At the University of Califor-
nia (UC) system, for example, the average 1998-99 indirect cost rate for the nine UC
campuses is 48.6%. See UNIV. OF CAL., OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, INDIRECT COST RATES
FOR THE PERIODJULY 1, 1998 THROUGH JUNE 30, 1999 (visitedJan. 23, 1999) <http://
ovcr.ucdavis.edu/ind98.htm> (copy on file with Journal).
132 See ENDLESS FRONTIER, supra note 125, at 6-7.
133 See id. at 6.
134 See id. at 5.
135 Lewis, supra note 33, at 376.
136 See INCREASED COMPETITION, supra note 19, ch. 4, at 2.
137 See id. ch. 4, at 5.
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the most significant was the fourteen year cap. This was the primary
obstacle for almost half of the thirty-eight drugs not extending.138
Furthermore, while Congress designed the extension provisions to
protect the pioneer industry's returns on its original investments,
which even before the Act's passage often did not cover research and
development costs, 8 9 the CBO admits that protection from the exten-
sions has been less than complete, meaning that pioneer companies
operate on an even thinner margin than before.
140
The second negative trend for the pioneer industry is a positive
one for the generic industry: name brand drugs now face more com-
petition in a shorter span of time. Generic drugs are now available on
a dramatically higher percentage of once-patented drugs.141 Further-
more, because of the pre-expiration testing once decried by Roche, ge-
neric drugs reach the market in only a fraction of the time it took
under the pre-Act regime. 142 Ultimately, because of these trends and
the preference for generic drugs by managed care companies, physi-
cians, 143 and the public,'4 the average generic market share for multi-
ple source drugs almost quintupled during the Act's first fourteen
years.145 Pioneer companies have attempted to slow this competition
through lawsuits, 146 but as demonstrated by the market share statistics,
this tactic has had little, if any, effect.
138 See id.
139 Industry estimates suggest that of drugs introduced between 1980 and 1984,
only one third earned back their production costs. See ENDLESS FRONTIER, supra note
125, at 2.
140 See INCaRASED COMPETrTON, supra note 19, ch. 4, at 1.
141 See id. The CBO estimates that before the Act's passage, 35% of drugs faced
generic competition, whereas today that number is almost 100%. See id.
142 See id. ch. 4, at 1-2. Whereas before the Act generic entry took between three
to four years, it now takes only a couple of months. See id.
143 Despite the concern regarding generic quality in the late 1980s, the number of
prescriptions filled with generics has continued to increase. In 1995, the chance of
getting a generic on a prescription was 40%, and estimates suggested by the year
2000, the odds would increase to 50%. See Doheny, supra note 92, at E3; see also supra
note 36 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of managed care and PBMs).
144 Following the Act's passage, as well as the FDA crisis and the concerns over
generic quality, many people, especially the elderly, were "confused" about generics.
See Horwitz, supra note 60, at B2. It is unclear whether public perception of generics
has changed, but it is likely that, with the increase in their usage, the public has be-
come more comfortable with the idea of generic drugs.
145 See INCREASED COMPETITION, supra note 19, ch. 4, at 1-2.
146 See Korman, supra note 32, § 3, at 4.
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3. Products Liability Complications
In addition to the economic pressures outlined previously, phar-
maceutical companies have also felt the effects of increased litigation
and rising damages awarded to products liability plaintiffs. The gen-
eral counsel for Johnson & Johnson put it simply: "In this litigation
climate, it's almost impossible to know how to plan your costs.
1 47
Under the current products liability regime in most states,
148
plaintiffs can sue product manufacturers under any or all of three pos-
sible theories: plaintiffs can allege defects in manufacturing, warning,
or design of the product.1 49 Manufacturing defect claims can be
launched against drug manufacturers in the same way as against the
producers of other products; if the drug was improperly produced in
violation of its design, the manufacturer is liable for harm the defect
causes.15 0 The main drawback to manufacturing defect claims is a
proof problem, as it is often difficult to establish that the product was
faulty at the time it was made.
In contrast to the relatively straightforward manufacturing claims,
warning and design claims are complicated for drugs by the "learned
intermediary" doctrine and the Restatement Second's comment k to
section 402A, respectively. In proceeding with a warning claim, the
plaintiff alleges that the seller or manufacturer was negligent and
should be held liable for failing to warn of the dangers associated with
the product or its use. Prescription drugs, however, which most pio-
neer drugs happen to be, are not dispensed directly from the manu-
facturer to the consumer. Instead, it is the plaintiff's doctor who
writes the prescription, and as a result, most jurisdictions regard the
prescribing physician, an expert in the medical field, as a "learned
intermediary." That is, the burden of warning the plaintiff is shifted
147 Tamar Lewin, Pharmaceutical Companies Are the Hardest Hit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,
1985, § 3, at 1.
148 The laws of the various states were inspired primarily by the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts (Restatement Second) § 402A. See, e.g., David Owen, Products Liability
Restated, 49 S.C. L. REV. 273 (1998) ("From the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, section
402A's doctrine... spread like wildfire from state to state .... .") It remains to be seen
how widely accepted the new Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (Re-
statement Third) will be.
149 While Restatement Second § 402A defines products liability generally, these
three categories of defects have developed through the case law. See, e.g., W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTS § 99, at 695 (5th ed.
1984). To embrace the changes in products liability, Restatement Third now also
utilizes these distinctions. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs: PRODUCTS LIABiLITY
§ 2(a)-(c) (1998).
150 SeeJustin Toth, Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices: The Impending Impact of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts in Texas, 35 Hous. LAWYER, May-Apr. 1998, at 41.
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from the drug maker to the doctor, so long as the manufacturer has
completely informed the doctor of the risks of the drug.151
The success of design defect claims against drug manufacturers
has varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, depending on the courts'
views about comment k to section 402A.' 52 Comment k describes
drugs as "unavoidably unsafe products" which, "in the present state of
human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their
intended and ordinary use."'153 Instead of embracing comment k as a
shield to design defect claims, however, many courts have viewed it as
an affirmative defense, to be examined on a case-by-case basis, often
utilizing the same risk-utility test applied to other products. 54 As a
result of this view, combined with the escalation in punitive damage
awards in all kinds of cases and the "snowball" effect of litigation,
many pioneer manufacturers have experienced severe losses in design
defect suits. 15 5 As the general counsel of Johnson & Johnson de-
scribed, "Even if we win almost every case against us, the few verdicts
we lose engender more suits, and make all the other suits more expen-
sive and more difficult to settle."' 56 Insurance rates for pioneer com-
panies have reflected the increased number of suits and the high costs
of losing them.157 Consequently, manufacturers have made cost-bene-
fit choices regarding what kinds of drugs to produce and to avoid.
158
151 See, e.g., Felixv. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 540 So.2d 102, 105 (Fla. 1989);John-
son v. American Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1324 (Kan. 1986); Niemiera v. Schnei-
der, 555 A.2d 1112, 1119 (N.J. 1989).
152 For an example of a court which considered the substantive issues and each of
the different views regarding comment k, see Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89,
92-95 (Utah 1991).
153 RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
154 See Toth, supra note 150, at 41.
155 See Lewin, supra note 147, § 3, at 1.
156 Id.
157 During a two year period in the mid 1980s, Johnson & Johnson's company
insurance premiums rose 50%. The president of Lederle Laboratories summarized
the insurance trends by saying, "deductibles are going up, and the upper limit of
insurance that's available is coming down." Id. § 3, at 9.
158 In the words of the Johnson &Johnson general counsel, "There has to come a
point with a particular product, even if it's a good product, where you say, that's
enough, and you get out of the market." Id. § 3, at 1. An example of this cost-benefit
rationalizing is whooping cough vaccine, which, like most vaccines, exposes children
to a weakened form of the disease. The inoculation causes brain damage in just over
three children for every one million vaccinated, yet, plagued by lawsuits from those
who incurred damages, two manufacturers of the vaccine left the market in 1985,
leaving only one remaining, after even tenfold price increases could not make the
vaccine profitable. The one remaining manufacturer, Lederle Laboratories, faced
litigation worth 200 times the value of the vaccine's sales. As of 1985, Lederle was also
the only manufacturer of the polio vaccine, whose risks are even less than whooping
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Some have suggested that the pioneers' products liability
problems may ease with the publication of the Restatement Third in
the spring of 1998.159 Section 6 of the Restatement Third specifically
describes the liability for drug manufacturers under design, manufac-
turing, and warning defect claims. While section 6 alters manufactur-
ing and warning claims in subtle ways, it considerably revamps the
standards of the old section 402A. Under Restatement Third section
6(c), drugs and medical devices are defectively designed only if "the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medical device are
sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that
reasonable health care providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks
and therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical de-
vice for any class of patients." 160 Thus, as commentators have noted, a
plaintiff can only succeed if the drug, as designed, "provides no net
benefit to any ascertainable patient class."'
16
This new standard is significantly elevated in comparison to the
Restatement Second, where, as interpreted by most courts, a manufac-
turer could be liable if the risks of the drug even slightly outweighed
its benefits. Thus, it would provide formidable protection for pioneer
companies from design defect claims, currently the most successful of
the three products liability actions, and thus insulate the pioneers
from one large source of revenue loss. Unfortunately, the effects of
the Restatement Third will not be known until it is either accepted or
rejected by a majority of jurisdictions.
B. Problems in Cost Containment
As Part III details, competition among generic manufacturers
spawned the corruption that led to the FDA crisis. While this power
struggle has sometimes led to lower prices, the intensity of the rivalry
among companies may have again escalated to the point where the
public should be concerned. Since 1996, generic manufacturers have
engaged in bitter market battles, slashing prices to drive out competi-
tors and then raising prices once they have achieved market con-
trol.16 2 As with pricing wars in other industries, however, these recent
cough-one in every three million are paralyzed-yet it incurred $20 million in dam-
ages from just one lawsuit that year. See id. § 3, at 9.
159 See Toth, supra note 150, at 40; Jeffrey Winchester, Section 8(c) of the Proposed
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Is It Really What the Doctor Ordered?, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 644
(1997).
160 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c) (1998).
161 Toth, supra note 150, at 42.
162 See DavidJ. Morrow, Old Drugs, New Labels: Brand Name Generics and Other Anom-
alies, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1998, at Dl.
[VOL. 75:1
NOTE: GENERIC DRUG PRICE SCANDAL
clashes have raised questions about the legality of generic companies'
tactics. 16 3 In December 1998, Mylan, the innocent whistleblower in
the FDA crisis, became the first generic company to face charges for
its current behavior.164
Until 1997, Profarmco, 165 the producer of active pharmaceutical
ingredients (APIs) for drugs such as lorazepam and clorazepate, 166
sold its products to several American generic companies, including
Mylan. At the time, Profarmco was the only supplier for several of
these ingredients. 67 According to the complaint filed by the FT, 168
in 1997 Mylan negotiated an agreement with Profarmco by which My-
lan would receive an exclusive license to the APIs for a ten year period
in return for a percentage of Mylan's sales of the drugs.169 Because of
Profarmco's status as sole supplier, this agreement effectively gave My-
lan complete control over the lorazepam and clorazepate markets in
the United States.
At about the same time, Mylan also approached FIS, one of
Profarmco's competitors which had previously made and sold the
lorazepam API but had withdrawn from the market. 170 Under Mylan's
proposal to FIS, Mylan would not actually purchase any API from FIS.
Instead, Mylan would pay FIS a portion of its lorazepam profits to
keep FIS from producing and selling the lorazepam API, thus elimi-
nating another potential source of the drug.' 71 FIS refused this ar-
rangement, "at least in part out of concern that such an agreement
could violate antitrust laws."1172 Despite this minor setback, however,
163 See generally Definitely a Cause of Anxiety, supra note 7, at B8; Stephen Labaton, A
Drug Maker ls Said to Face a Suit on Prices, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1998, at Al (discussing the
events leading up to the FTC complaint against Mylan Laboratories, Inc.).
164 See Labaton, supra note 163, at Al.
165 Profarmco S.R.L. is an Italian subsidiary of Cambrex Corp., a Delaware phar-
maceutical company. Profarmco sold its products in America through a distribution
company named Gyma. See FTC Complaint, supra note 8, at 2, 9.
166 Lorazepam is a widely-prescribed sedative used to treat anxiety, insomnia, and
as an anesthetic for surgery. Clorazepate is also an anti-anxiety drug but has addi-
tional uses in treating hypertension and several forms of addiction. See id. at 3, 15.
167 See id. at 2-4. For example, in 1997, Profarmco was the supplier for 90% of the
lorazepam and all of the clorazepate sold in the United States. See id. at 5, 25.
168 The FTC suit was joined by 10 states, including Connecticut, Florida, Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and New York. See Robert Pear, U.S. Will Sue Drug Maker Over Pricing,
N.Y. Tmms, Dec. 22, 1998, at Cl. California, which had filed its own class action suit,
was expected to join soon after the complaint was filed. See Definitely a Cause of Anxi-
ety, supra note 7, at B8.
169 See FTC Complaint, supra note 8, at 4-5.
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Mylan allegedly continued with its plan, by denying lorazepam to any
competitors that sought to purchase it from them, and then in 1998,
by raising prices up to 3200 percent.173 In response to this price in-
crease, FIS, through its distributor SST, reentered the lorazepam mar-
ket, selling the API to Geneva, a Mylan competitor. In doing so,
however, FIS and SST raised their prices 19,000 percent.1 74 Geneva,
in turn, raised its prices for pharmacists and doctors to a level compa-
rable with Mylan's.1 75 This chain reaction touched off a wave of com-
plaints from the public and their legislators, with the FTC estimating
that the price increases cost the public over $120 million.
1 76
In response, the FTC filed an eight count complaint, charging
Mylan, Cambrex, Profarmco, and Gyma with antitrust violations, in-
cluding restraint of trade, 177 monopolization,1 7 and conspiracy.17 9 In
addition to the more typical injunctive relief, the FTC also prayed for
financial damages, asking the court to disgorge Mylan and the other
defendants of the $120 million generated by the increased prices.' 80
Some have called this second approach "unusual" and "aggressive"''1
and see this as the ETC "testing a relatively new enforcement strat-
egy."1 82 It remains to be seen whether the court embraces this ap-
proach. If not, and if actions like those of Mylan become more
prevalent, the public may face a rapid reversal of the generic savings
seen in the 1980s.
V. CONCLUSION
The biggest problem arising from the state of the pharmaceutical
industry today may best be illustrated by examining the purpose of the
Orphan Drug Amendments described in Part II. The Orphan Drug
Amendments acknowledge that private industry will only manufacture
173 See id. For example, the wholesale price for a bottle of 500 tablets of cloraze-
pate increased from $11.36 to $377. See Pear, supra note 168, at Cl. As the FTC
complaint points out repeatedly, these price increases were not associated with any
concomitant increase in costs. See FTC Complaint, supra note 8, at 4-6.
174 See FTC Complaint, supra note 8, at 5-6.
175 See id. at 6.
176 See Pear, supra note 168, at C1.
177 Counts one and two allege restraint of trade violations of 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)
(1994). See FTC Complaint, supra note 8, at 7.
178 Counts five and seven allege monopolization, while counts six and eight allege
attempted monopolization. See id. at 9-11.
179 Counts three and four allege conspiracy to monopolize. See id. at 7-9.
180 See id. at 11.
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products when it is profitable to do so. Furthermore, the Amendments
articulate the well-accepted public policy that medicines, even for the
rarest of diseases, are valuable enough to society that it is willing to
make economic sacrifices in order to promote their development.
Given the implications of this policy, it may be that the Act's time has
come and gone.
The Act's passage and the trends that have followed it have
placed an increasing strain on the abilities of the pioneer drug indus-
try. Simultaneously, society's expectations of the industry, as shown by
the decrease of funding to non-profit research centers and the in-
creased treatment of patients through pharmaceuticals by managed
care, have only increased. It is true that the use of generic drugs since
the Act's passage has saved countless consumer dollars, and those sav-
ings have repeatedly been used tojustify the hardship imposed on the
pioneer industry. However, health care costs have not decreased over-
all, and in light of the most recent developments with Mylan, which
calls even the cost containment function of generic drugs into ques-
tion, society must accept that, despite the cost, it will only be medically
prepared for the new millennium by encouraging the pioneer indus-
try to expand research and development.
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